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Abstract
Much research and policy attention has been on socio-economic gaps in participation at
university, but less attention has been paid to socio-economic gaps in graduates’ earnings. This
paper addresses this shortfall using tax and student loan administrative data to investigate
the variation in earnings of English graduates by socio-economic background. We find that
graduates from higher income families (with median income of around £77,000) have average
earnings which are 20% higher than those from lower income families (with median income of
around £26,000). Once we condition on institution and subject choices, this premium roughly
halves, to around 10%. The premium grows with age and is larger for men, in particular for
men at the most selective universities. We estimate the extent to which different institutions
and subjects appear to deliver good earnings for relatively less well off students, highlighting the
good performance of medicine, economics, law, business, engineering, technology and computer
science, as well as the prominent London-based universities.
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1 Introduction
Higher education is seen as a potentially crucial tool for social mobility, providing a possible route
for students from lower income family backgrounds to achieve labour market success and higher
earnings. Consequently there have been numerous government policies around the world focussed
on improving access to university degrees for those from poorer households. However, there is
relatively little evidence on whether this should be the primary focus of governments trying to
improve social mobility.
Consistent with most countries around the world, in England educational achievement and
higher education access varies substantially by the level of parental income, with many fewer stu-
dents from poorer backgrounds attending university, particularly the highest status institutions
(Chowdry et al. (2013), Ermisch et al. (2012)). However, little is known about the differences in
earnings between graduates from poorer and richer family backgrounds. Further, primarily due to
data limitations, the question of whether differences in earnings still exist conditional on univer-
sity and subject choice, has remained largely unanswered.1 In this paper we are able to address
these shortfalls in the literature by making use of a unique administrative database that tracks the
earnings of graduates into their mid thirties.
We use a dataset that consists of anonymised individual level-administrative taxable earnings
data supplied by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), linked to information on students’
higher education (university or college) from the English Student Loan Company (SLC). The latter
is an institution supported by the state to provide loans to students to fund their higher education.
The HMRC and SLC data sets are hard linked using a national identification number (National
Insurance number2) and we have access to a 10% random sample. We study cohorts of students who
entered higher education from 1999-2005, and focus on the same students’ earnings between 2008/09
and 2013/14. This allows us to follow graduates through their most crucial career developing years
and well into their thirties. We also use Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) data which we
can match at the subject-institution (rather than individual) level. This includes the socio-economic
background and prior academic achievement of the students studying the same subject in the same
institution. This allows us to add further controls that capture differences in the demographics of
students in a given university and subject, although we acknowledge that this does not eliminate
ability bias in returns or deal with differential selection into courses across individuals from different
socio-economic backgrounds.
1The exceptions include a number of papers that investigate returns to private versus state secondary school
education in the UK, conditional on university education (for example Crawford et al. (2016)), and Chetty et al.
(2017) which investigates variation in returns to attending university by parental income in the US.
2This is the key individual identifier for all taxes, social security and student loans.
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A common problem with administrative data is a limited set of background characteristics
for individuals.3 We also face these limitations, and do not directly observe parental income for
individuals in our sample. However, we are able to infer a simple binary measure of parental income
based a student’s SLC record, which notes the amount each student borrowed in their first year of
study. For English students starting university before 2006, the amount individuals were eligible to
borrow was linked in a monotonic way to their parental income. We identify people as being from
a higher income household if they are borrowing exactly the maximum amount an individual from
a higher income household is eligible for in their first year of study.4 This consists of approximately
20% of borrowers, which in the paper we refer to as the richer group. The remaining 80% of
borrowers are of course relatively poorer, rather than poor in an absolute sense. Indeed, based
on a sample of borrowers in the Family Resources Survey, we estimate that the median parental
earnings of these groups is around £77,000 for the richer group and around £26,000 for the rest
(2018 prices).
Clearly our parental income measure is likely to have issues with measurement; people from
poorer households might borrow the rich maximum, people from richer households might not bor-
row the rich maximum, and we are unable to say anything at all about the roughly 15% of people
who attend university but choose not to borrow, which is likely to be weighted towards those from
higher income households. Given these measurement issues - all of which are likely to bias down our
estimates - we find considerable differences in earnings between graduates from richer and relatively
less well off family backgrounds. These differences roughly halve once we condition on subject and
institution choices but remain economically important at around 10%, and are statistically signif-
icant. These socio-economic differences also exist right through the earnings distribution and are
larger at the bottom and top of the earnings distribution, suggesting family wealth is particularly
good at both protecting graduates against very poor outcomes and providing them with opportu-
nities for very high earnings. The conditional differences grow with age and are somewhat smaller
for Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) or Law, Economics and Manage-
ment/Business (LEM) as compared to other subjects. They are also particularly pronounced for
men from the most selective universities.
These findings are descriptive, but clearly important for policy. Data limitations mean we are
unable to control for: individual-level qualifications;5 degree outcomes, such as completion and
3The availability of linked administrative data has improved dramatically in the UK in recent years. The Lon-
gitudinal Educational Outcomes data (LEO) allows the linkage of entire education histories of individuals to their
earnings records. However, these data are currently available only for government research.
4There were subsequent changes to both tuition fees and student support that took effect from 2006 - see Section
3 for more detail. These changes do not affect our results, however, as we focus on the first-year borrowing of people
who entered university before 2006.
5The period we are looking at was before the big increase in ‘contextualised admissions’ policies whereby universi-
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degree classification (i.e. grades); progression onto (and timing of) postgraduate study; and early
career occupation choices. These, along with differences in non-cognitive skills and the networks
of those from richer and poorer backgrounds should be the subject of future research into under-
standing the drivers of these earnings differences, and could have important implications for firms,
universities and policy.
Finally, we follow Chetty et al. (2017) by estimating ‘social mobility scorecards’, which measure
the extent to which different universities appear to help students from relatively poorer backgrounds
get into the top fifth of graduate earners (specifically the ‘mobility score’ is the probability of a
course admitting a poorer student multiplied by the probability that the student goes on to enter
the top fifth of the earnings distribution). Our parental income measure is less rich than that
used by Chetty et al. (2017), who focus on the bottom 20% of the observed parental earnings
distribution, and consequently our results are not directly comparable. However, unlike Chetty
et al. (2017) we are able to estimate mobility scorecards for different subject disciplines. We
find that medicine and economics are particularly good at delivering relatively poorer students
into the top 20% of the graduate earnings distribution. However, it is not clear that all STEM
subjects are broadly effective at delivering this. On the other hand, we find that LEM subjects
are effective. More broadly, professional facing subjects (e.g. LEM, computer science, engineering,
technology, business) seem to deliver routes to social mobility. At the other end of the scale,
biological sciences, mass communication and creative arts subjects do this to a much lesser extent.
For institutions, the high-profile London universities - namely the LSE, Imperial College, King’s
College and UCL - do very well by this index, while outside of London, Warwick and Manchester
are two of the best performing universities from the set we have permission to name.6 These results
are necessarily descriptive only and come with several caveats. However, they represent the first
descriptive evidence on which institutions and subjects are best for encouraging social mobility.
The paper is laid out as follows. In the next section we discuss our contribution to the existing
literature. In Section 3 we outline the institutional details of Higher Education in the UK. In
Section 4 we describe our data and introduce our measure of parental income. In Section 5 we
presents results from our modelling. In Section 6 present social mobility scorecards by subject and
institution. Section 7 concludes.
ties make lower offers to students who had attended certain schools, typically those in poorer neighbourhoods. This
suggests it would be more important to control for individual qualifications for later cohorts.
6Given HMRC rules about anonymity, we can only name institutions which gave explicit permission, which we
received from 18 institutions (see Section 6 for the full set of these).
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2 Existing literature
This work will contribute to an important literature that has suggested a major impact from higher
education on individuals’ earnings. We focus on the English graduate labour market (Blundell et al.
(2005)), though our findings are also relevant to the large US literature which has looked at the
heterogeneity in graduate earnings by subject and institution (see, for example, Dale and Krueger
(2014) as well as Webber (2014) and Altonji et al. (2015) for reviews). The evidence of a sizeable
graduate wage premium for English graduates is convincing, see for example (Walker and Zhu
(2011)). Yet although higher education in England appears to be a good investment for many, as is
the case for the US, there is also a sizeable empirical literature that has shown substantial variation
in graduate earnings that has increased over time (Chevalier (2011), Hussain et al. (2009), Sloane
and O’Leary (2005), Smith and Naylor (2001), Walker and Zhu (2011)). A key question is therefore,
given this increased diversity in graduates’ earnings, whether students from poorer backgrounds
achieve the same earnings gains compared to their similarly qualified counterparts who come from
more richer families.
Differences in earnings between graduates from poorer and richer family backgrounds may of
course be attributable to differences in the institutions they attend and the subjects they study.
Previous work has shown that graduate earnings vary considerably by subject of degree (Sloane
and O’Leary (2005), Chevalier (2011), Walker and Zhu (2011), Walker and Zhu (2013), Chowdry
et al. (2013)). Walker and Zhu (2013) suggested substantial differences in private returns by degree
subject and insignificant differences in returns by institution type (the data were insufficiently
granular to analyse at institution level). Britton et al. (2016) also found considerable variation in
earnings by both subject and institution, though much of this difference is attributable to different
prior achievement levels of the students taking different degree options. Since prior achievement
levels are lower, on average, for poorer students, we would expect sorting by subject and institution
to depress their earnings.
Even with similar subject field and institution choices, an individual’s socio-economic back-
ground may have an effect on their labour market outcomes after graduation. This might be
because students from more advantaged backgrounds have higher levels of (non-cognitive) skills
(see for example Blanden et al. (2007) and Kassenboehmer et al. (2018)) that are not measured
by their highest education level, or by their degree subject or institution. Related to this, perfor-
mance in the degree could be important. Crawford et al. (2016) show that students from poorer
socio-economic backgrounds are less likely to complete a degree and are less likely to graduate with
a top grade than their more wealthy peers. We do not observe any non-cognitive skills or degree
outcomes (grades or whether a student completes the degree) in our dataset.
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Alternatively, advantaged graduates may earn more because they have greater levels of social
capital and are able to use their networks to secure higher paid employment. The literature in
the UK at least does suggest that graduates from more advantaged backgrounds, particularly
privately educated students, achieve higher status occupations and there is some evidence that
privately educated students earn a higher return to their degree (Bukodi and Goldthorpe (2011b),
Bukodi and Goldthorpe (2011a), Macmillan et al. (2013), Crawford and Vignoles (2014)). For
example, Crawford and Vignoles (2014) found that graduates who attended private secondary
schools earn around 7% more per year, on average, than state school students 3.5 years after
graduation, even when comparing otherwise similar graduates and allowing for differences in degree
subject, university attended and degree classification. This is consistent with earlier work using
data from the 1970s and 1980s by Dolton and Vignoles (2000) that found the earnings return for
graduates varied according to whether the individual attended a private school or a state school.
This research also found that the private school wage premium for graduates who left university in
1980 was 7% for males but there was no premium for females, conditional on subject of degree and
institution. Similar results were found by Naylor (2002) for a cohort of 1993 graduates (3% wage
premium) and Green et al. (2012) using the National Child Development Study 1958 cohort and
the 1970 British Cohort Study. The latter found that the private school wage premium increased
from 4% for the earlier cohort to 10% for the later one. By contrast, work on how graduates’
earnings vary by parental income level or parental socio-economic status, rather than by whether
they attended private school, is more limited. For example, using the British Cohort Study (BCS)
Bratti et al. (2005) found little evidence of variation in the return to a degree by social class.
Beyond the UK, there is an impressive body of work that has drawn on administrative data
largely from Scandinavian countries (and some US states) to investigate the relationship between
parental income and children’s outcomes Figlio et al. (2015). Much of this work estimates causal
impacts of parental income or education on children’s educational outcomes (e.g. Black et al.
(2005)). There is less work on the extent to which parental earnings impact on graduate’s earnings,
conditional on the nature of the higher education achieved. Perhaps the most relevant paper in this
body of literature is Chetty et al. (2017) which looks at this issue for the US using administrative tax
data linked to data from the National Student Loan Data System for around 30 million individuals
who were university students between 1999 and 2013. Their study has the advantage of granular
information on both parent and child income (the former measured when the student was aged 15-19
and the latter when the student was 32-34). From this, they were able to construct intergenerational
income correlations for graduates from different institutions. They found stark differences in the
likelihood of poor students accessing elite institution. For instance, a student with parents in the
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top 1% of the income distribution is 77 times more likely to go to an Ivy League university than
those with parents in the bottom fifth of the income distribution. However, they also concluded
that students from poorer and richer backgrounds did similarly well if they graduated from the
same college. At least for those who are able to gain access, universities appear to be levelling
the income playing field in the US. Our study has key differences from Chetty et al. (2017). First,
our measure of parental income is binary which is a clear limitation. Second, unlike Chetty et al.
(2017) we are able to control for subject of study at the individual level, which is important
given the evidence on variation in earnings by subject and the early subject specialisation in the
English system which differs markedly from the broader curricula of the average US bachelors
degree. Third, in England it is less likely, on average, for wealthy but low achieving students
to gain access to elite institutions. This is potentially due to differences in the HE admissions
and funding systems, with the English system at this time arguably presenting fewer barriers to
access compared to the US system. Admission in England is centralised and regulated, with the
probability of entry into elite institutions closely correlated with students’ prior achievement in
national examinations taken at age 18 (A levels or equivalent). English tuition fees were also
comparatively very low during this period and were income contingent, so students from poorer
households could be exempt from paying. This point is reflected in evidence for England (Chowdry
et al. (2013)) which found that conditional on prior achievement, there was no socio-economic
gap on entry into HE and a gap of just a few percentage points on entry into elite universities.
These different institutional arrangements may mean that the socio-economic selectivity into HE,
and particularly elite institutions, is somewhat different in the two countries which will impact
on graduates’ earnings, especially given that both Chetty et al. (2017) and our own study are
limited by not having individual level measures of skill or IQ. Hence the analyses in both papers is
necessarily descriptive.
3 Institutional Background
During the period of study, the minimum school leaving age in England was 16, although com-
fortably more than half of students stayed in school until age 18. The majority of those that
progress on to university do so within the first two years of leaving school. The vast majority of
university degrees are in one subject (or sometimes two subjects combined) and take three to four
years. Subject specialisation therefore occurs relatively early by international standards (and, in
particular, compared to the US). It is very common in England to move out of the family home for
university, and the government has been loaning money to students to help with their living costs
during study since the 1980s.
7
The English Student Loan Company (SLC) was introduced in 1990 to administer a reformed
version of these ‘mortgage-style’ living cost loans for English students attending a higher education
in the UK. There were no tuition fees at the time. The mortgage-style nature of the loans meant
that repayments were in equal instalments that were independent of student’s subsequent income.7
In 1998, means-tested tuition fees of up to £1,000 per year (1998 prices) were introduced for
the first time, with fees payable up front. Alongside this, the living cost (‘maintenance’) loans now
became income contingent, so that individuals were automatically deducted 9% of their income
above a threshold (initially this threshold was £10,000, though it increased on several occasions
since) by the tax authority (HMRC). Any outstanding loans were written off when the individual
turned 65.8 Interest rates on student loans were set equal to the lowest of the Bank of England
base rate plus 1% and the RPI measure of inflation. This is the regime that all of the students in
our estimation in this paper were facing, namely the cohorts of students which started university
between 1999 and 2005 who borrowed from the English SLC.
Crucially for our design, maintenance loans eligibility was dependent on parental income.9 All
individuals were eligible for some loan, but people from lower income households could borrow more.
People who wanted to borrow more had to prove their income in the previous year by submitting
their end of year tax statement (‘P60’) to HMRC. This meant it was difficult for people from higher
income households to gain access to the larger loans. People could also borrow more if they lived
in London during their studies (due to the higher living costs), while there was a different cap for
those living with their parents while studying.10 See Table 2 in the following section for the non
income-assessed maximum loan amounts inside and outside London.
Subsequently, there have been further changes in England. In 2006, fees were increased to
£3,000 per year (2006 prices), although students could now borrow this money from the SLC
to add to their student loans. Alongside this, there were changes to the rules for maintenance
loan eligibility. Prior to 2006, individuals from poorer backgrounds could borrow the most. From
2006, the relationship became non-monotonic, as maintenance loans were increased as grants were
tapered, which resulted in students from middle-earning families borrowing the most.
Combined, these changes make it very difficult to identify poorer individuals in the data from
7Borrowers were eligible to start making repayments once they started earning more than a certain threshold
(85% of average annual earnings for full-time workers). They could also defer payments if they earned less than that
amount in a given year.
8In 2006 the write-off period was reduced to 25 years from leaving HE. In 2012 it was lengthened again to 30 years
from leaving HE.
9Other forms of financial support, including cash bursaries and hardship loans were available during this period.
These are unobservable to us, but fortunately did not affect loan eligibility, which means they are unimportant for
our identification of richer and poorer individuals.
10See the Statistical First Release series from the Student Loan Company on student support for higher education,
for example SLC SFR 03/2005.
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2006 onwards. This is primarily because the poorest students could now borrow almost exactly
the same amount as the richest students (although they did receive additional living cost support
through maintenance grants), but also because not everybody borrowed the tuition fee loans. In-
dividuals who start under a given regime stay in that regime (so, for example, if you start a degree
in 2005, you are not eligible to pay £3,000 fees in 2006). In any case, we identify poorer individ-
uals based on the amount they borrow in their first year of study only, which avoids issues with
borrowing different amounts in different years, or variable course length. The first year borrowing
of people starting university between 1999 and 2005 is therefore completely unaffected by the 2006
reforms.11
There were further considerable changes to the English system in 2012;12 fees were trebled
to £9,000 per year (2012 prices), interest rates were increased to RPI plus up to 3% and there
were a number of other changes to the repayment conditions. Subsequently maintenance grants for
poorer students were abolished again, which meant a return to the situation of the poorest students
borrowing the most. Again, these changes do not affect our results directly, but it is worth keeping
in mind that the system is now very different to the one in place during our period of analysis.
We were unable to gain access to equivalent student loan data for the rest of the UK which are
administered by separate bodies. We therefore do not observe students from Wales, Scotland or
Northern Ireland. Higher Education is a devolved policy area, which means there is now consid-
erable variation in policy across the UK. However, in the period we are interested in (1999-2005
starters), this is less true; at this point the different systems were quite similar. Although non-UK
European Union residents were also eligible to borrow from the English SLC, we do not observe
them in our dataset either.
4 Data
This is an exciting new dataset for investigating graduate outcomes. Other UK surveys, such as the
Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE) survey,
have information on subject of study and institution. However, information on higher education
institution has only recently been collected by the LFS, limiting the sample sizes available to
researchers. The LFS also has only very limited data on the parents of graduates. Meanwhile, the
DLHE does have information on graduates’ earnings by subject and institution but has issues with
11Focussing on first year borrowing also means that we are unaffected by the fact that course length is variable
(typically 3-5 years).
12Another important change is the large increase in ‘contextualised admissions’, whereby universities make lower
offers to students who had attended certain schools, typically those in poorer neighbourhoods. This was not highly
prevalent during the period we are investigating, but it suggests both that earnings gaps might change for later
cohorts and also that conditioning on qualifications on entry might be a crucial addition for these cohorts.
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sample selection (it is a voluntary online survey) and only captures full time equivalent earnings
just three and a half years after graduation. Our data by contrast is able to provide insight into
graduates’ earnings up to more than a decade after graduation. More extensive detail on the dataset
is provided in Britton et al. (2018). We have a 10% sub sample of all borrowers from the English
part of the SLC, which means they had to be domiciled in England upon application to university
and attend a university in the UK. We have data on those who entered higher education between
1998-2008 but focus on the 1999-2005 entrants (henceforth, ‘cohorts’) because of the low uptake
of loans in 1998 (driven by the slow transition into the income contingent loan system) and the
availability of tuition fee loans and maintenance grants after 2005 (see discussion above).
These data provide us with information on gender, first year of study (cohort),13 institution
attended,14 field of study,15 region on application to higher education and a detailed measure
of income from employment (Pay As You Earn taxable income) and from self employment (Self
Assessment income). We do not observe degree outcomes, which means we do not see degree
classification or indeed completion. This could of course be important, although we note that
dropout rates are low by international standards at around 10%.16
We focus on earnings data from the tax years 2008/09 through 2013/14. We use earnings from
labour, meaning employment income, profits from partnerships and profits from self-employment
are included. We exclude trust income, profits on share transactions, profits from land and property,
income from foreign employment, savings, UK dividends, pension income, life policy gains, ‘other’
income, bank and building society interest. Clearly we are focussing on a period that follows
the 2008 recession, which should be kept in mind when considering the results, as it may have
implications for the magnitudes of the effects that we see. For example, wealthier students might
be more likely to partake in postgraduate study during the start of the recession and that may
boost their income subsequently compared to their less well off peers. Unfortunately we are unable
to use other years of earnings data.
The sample sizes for our cohorts of interest are given in Table 1, which also shows the gender
split. These samples reflect 10% of English borrowers at UK Higher Education Providers. These
13For people who switched degrees we observe their second degree course. The total debt figures include previous
borrowing, but the ‘first year borrowing’ that we use is from the first year of the course we observe them studying.
14Students in officially recognised UK higher education learning institutions are eligible for loans. The government
defines these as either ‘recognised’ or ‘listed’. The former can award degrees and the latter can offer courses that lead
to a degree from a recognised institution. We observe students at both types of institution meaning some Further
Education Colleges will be included. Overall there are several hundred of these, although we observe 170 distinct
institutions with the rest classified as ‘other’ institutions.
15We observe the first digit of the ‘JACS’ code, which is a broad subject level classification set by HESA. JACS
codes at this level include a heterogeneous range of courses. For example ‘biological sciences’ ranges from psychology
to biology. Whilst we would ideally control for subject of study at a more granular level, this was not possible for
disclosivity reasons. If there is lots of variation by background within the JACS code measures, this could affect our
results (e.g. poorer students might choose courses within the JACS bands that have lower earnings potential).
16See https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/performance-indicators/non-continuation
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sample sizes align with overall numbers from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) for
the same period. There are more women, reflecting the higher participation rates of women in the
UK (rather than different borrowing behaviour). Note that we use up to six years of earnings data
for each individual throughout the majority of this paper.
Cohort All Men Women
1999 22,621 10,590 12,031
2000 23,506 10,853 12,653
2001 23,924 11,025 12,899
2002 23,891 11,060 12,831
2003 23,972 11,024 12,948
2004 23,577 10,767 12,810
2005 25,103 11,439 13,664
Table 1: Number of graduates (10% sample of loan database), by cohort and gender. Cohort denotes the first year
the individual received a loan from the SLC.
The administrative data described above is linked to data from HESA. Whilst we cannot link
data at the individual level, we are able to do it at the institution and subject level. This provides a
quantitative profile of the characteristics of students in each institution-subject combination. These
data enable us to control more effectively for the characteristics of students attending different
institutions and taking different subjects. This is important if we are trying to identify the residual
correlation between socio-economic background and subsequent earnings after allowing for the fact
that poorer students take different degree options. These data also allow us to control for the
government region in which the student’s institution is located, which is important since wages
vary by region and we do not have data on the graduates’ current location (current region is in any
case endogenous since graduates with degrees that are more highly valued in the labour market
may be better able to secure high paying jobs in high paying regions). Since a high proportion of
graduates remain near their university when they enter the labour market, controlling for region
of institution goes some way to account for this issue. We use HESA data from 2002/03. The key
characteristics which we can control for (all averaged at the subject-institution level) are: UCAS
‘tariff score’,17 ethnic composition, gender composition and measures of students’ socio-economic
status. The latter include parental occupation, the percentage of students living at home whilst
studying, the percentage of students who attended an English state school (i.e., non-private) and
the ‘Participation of Local Areas’ (POLAR) classification (neighbourhood level participation in
higher education by age 19).
17The tariff score is a single quantitative summary of the performance of students prior to entering university in
national tests taken at Advanced level (A level) or equivalent at age 18.
11
4.1 Creating our measure of parental income
Our focus is on how graduates’ earnings vary by socio-economic background of the student. Unfor-
tunately the data do not include a direct measure of parental income. As discussed above, during
this period, the SLC loaned English domiciled students at UK universities money to help with their
living costs. Crucially the amount loaned varied by parental income. Our database includes the
amount borrowed by each graduate for their student loan overall and in their first year of borrow-
ing. We are able to use this to make an inference about the parental income of each individual
because the maximum amount the UK Government was willing to loan a student depended on
their parents’ income, with individuals from lower income households able to borrow more than
their more well-off peers. As discussed, for the 1999-2005 cohorts that we investigate, there was
a monotonic relationship between how much individuals could borrow and their parental income,
with the students coming from the poorest households able to borrow the most.
There is a lot of noise in the observed amount individuals borrow. However, for each of the
1999-2005 cohorts we observe clear spikes at points in the distribution that we are able to exploit.
To explain this, we provide an illustrative density plot in Figure 1. This shows the distribution of
the amount individuals borrow in their first year of study, where x is the maximum an individual
from a higher income household can borrow, or the ‘unassessed maximum’. The plot is normalised
so x is set to 0 to allow for the fact that the maximum amount changes each year and differs for
individuals studying inside and outside London to allow for the fact that the borrowing limits are
higher in London. People borrowing more than x need to provide evidence of their parents’ earnings







Figure 1: Illustrative density plot of amount borrowed. x represents the higher income maximum, while y represents
the lower income maximum. Amounts and densities deliberately excluded for disclosure reasons.
The exact loan amounts for each year, the minimum parental income threshold and the share
of individuals at different points in the distribution x are given in Table 2. The biggest spike in the
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distribution is at exactly £x, with the share at this point increasing from around 15% in the 1999
cohort to around 25% in the 2005 cohort and averages around 20% across all cohorts. Although
not shown here, the distributions are very similar when split by gender, but with slightly more
men borrowing exactly x. The next biggest spike is at exactly £y, where between 10 and 15% are
borrowing exactly the overall maximum.
We also see from the table that around one-third of borrowers borrow less than x and around
20% borrowers borrow between £x and £y. We also see around 20% of borrowers above the official
maximum. These individuals are most likely lower income individuals studying courses with longer
than standard term lengths.
Parental Income Loan Amounts** Distribution of borrowing (b)
Cohort Threshold* (£) x (£) y (£) b < x b = x x < b < y b = y y < b
1999 35,000 2,795 3,635 33.1 14.6 20.9 9.5 21.8
(3,445) (4,480)
2000 36,000 2,795 3,725 31.8 18.9 17.2 10.8 21.3
(3,445) (4,590)
2001 38,500 2,860 3,815 30.4 21.4 17.0 10.8 20.4
(3,525) (4,700)
2002 40,000 2,930 3,905 30.2 21.8 17.1 11.6 19.3
(3,610) (4,815)
2003 40,000 3,000 4,000 29.5 23.8 14.9 13.2 18.6
(3,695) (4,930)
2004 40,950 3,070 4,095 27.8 24.8 16.0 14.4 17.0
(3,790) (5,050)
2005 41,950 3,145 4,195 26.5 25.8 16.1 13.3 18.3
(3,885) (5,175)
Table 2: Loan availability and borrower distribution by loan amounts. *This the minimum parental income someone
can have to qualify to borrow more than x. **Loan amounts for people studying at a university in London are given
in the parentheses.
Using this measure of borrowing we infer a blunt measure of parental income that we set equal
to one (indicating high parental income) if the individual borrows exactly x in her first year, and
zero otherwise (indicating low parental income). Based on data from the Family Resources Survey
(FRS), we were able to approximate the average earnings of our two groups. Taking the set of
18-21 year olds living with their parents and borrowing a student loan between 2002 and 2005, we
observe that the average parental earnings of those above the threshold for extra loans was around
£77,400, while the average parental income of those earnings below the threshold was £25,900 in
2018 prices.18 Around 30% of borrowers are above the parental income threshold, which is not
dramatically more than the 25% we observe at the rich maximum in 2004.
We acknowledge that this measure of parental income does not perfectly identify all student
18Based on around 1,000 borrowers. These numbers include the parents’ income from employment and any other
private sources, including private pensions and investments. It does not include state benefits (which are not included
in student loan assessment) or state pensions (which are, but only a small fraction of parents in the sample are old
enough to be eligible). We thank Jonathan Cribb of the IFS for these calculations.
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from higher income households, for a number of reasons. First, those from higher income households
may borrow less than the maximum available. Second, individuals from lower income households
may choose to only borrow the higher income maximum because they do not want to borrow more
or are unable to provide evidence of their parent’s income. Third, we are missing altogether those
individuals from the wealthiest households who did not borrow at all. While this figure is around
15% of the overall student population, it is likely to represent considerable fractions of the student
populations at some high-status institutions in particular. Fourth, there may be misreporting of
parental income to the SLC, though they do require official proof of income to gain access to
additional loans. Whilst we cannot completely overcome these weaknesses in our measure, we
do provide indicative evidence below that it does indeed identify individuals from more wealthy
households. Further, we suggest that most of these issues with the measure are likely to bias our
impacts towards zero.
4.1.1 Validation of the parental income indicator
Here we investigate whether our simple indicator is indeed picking up higher income individuals
by showing how it relates to university access and voluntary repayments. First, we show the share
of higher income students in different types of institutions. We know that poorer students on
average access less selective universities where the mean entry tariff score is lower. We divide all
the universities in our database up into deciles based on the mean entry scores of their students,
taken from HESA data. We split the top 10% of universities into two groups to identify the most
elite top 5% of universities since this group is of particular policy interest given their very high
earnings (Britton et al. (2016)) and their relatively low shares of poorer students. In Figure 2 we
plot the share of higher income students (conditional on being borrowers) in each of these university
groups, by gender. It is clear that for both men and women, universities with higher entry criteria
have much higher shares of individuals we define as being from a higher income household. In the
most selective universities, more than half of students come from the 20% of individuals we define






























































































































University groups, based on position in distribution of exam scores of entrants
Women
Figure 2: Share of individuals in each university group at the higher income HH borrowing amount. Includes the
1999-2005 cohorts. Shares incorporate borrowers only.
Second, we examine the voluntary repayments of students. These are repayments of student
loan amounts that are made direct to the SLC over and above the legally required repayments that
are determined by the graduates’ income level. Given the loan forgiveness and the low real rate of
interest faced by the cohorts we are investigating, voluntary overpayment does not appear to be an
optimal strategy for graduates. However, a summary of voluntary repayments is given by gender in
Table 3, and clearly a significant amount of repayments occur, possibly due to debt aversion19 or to
avoid overpayment.20 We are interested in these repayments because conditional on the graduates’
own level of income, they may be more likely to be made by those from wealthier families who can
afford such lump sum payments. From Table 3 we see that around 9% of students make voluntary
repayments at some point between starting university and 2011, the final year we have data on
voluntary repayments. The mean annual repayment (conditional on making a repayment) amount
is around £2,500. A marginally higher share of women make repayments than men, and women
on average make more voluntary repayments, with 34% of those making any repayments making
more than one, versus 29% for men. However average repayments are typically smaller for women
than they are for men.
19Recently some lenders, including mortgage lenders, do take account of the presence of student debt when making
lending decisions, which might make it desirable to pay off student debt more rapidly, but this was not very common
in the period we are investigating.
20There have been incidents of this that were widely reported in the British press. They occur due to slow
communication about repayments and outstanding debt between HMRC and the SLC. People with variable income




Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N
Share ever making repays 0.08 - 76,776 0.09 - 89,818
Share making > 1 repayment 0.29 - 6,460 0.34 - 7,991
Share making > 2 repayments 0.13 - 6,460 0.16 - 7,991
Share making > 3 repayments 0.06 - 6,460 0.08 - 7,991
£ £
Average repay overall 2,840 4,071 9,544 2,490 3,785 12,632
Average repay 4 years from starting 5,058 4,696 419 5,041 4,613 608
Average repay 5 years from starting 4,720 5,222 813 4,037 4,913 1,182
Average repay 6 years from starting 3,817 4,795 1,015 3,208 4,399 1,485
Average repay 7 years from starting 3,146 4,422 1,249 2,478 3,802 1,722
Average repay 8 years from starting 2,494 3,668 1,224 2,144 3,491 1,684
Average repay 9 years from starting 2,407 3,715 1,283 2,066 3,383 1,740
Average repay 10 years from starting 2,292 3,413 1,406 1,891 3,071 1,712
Average repay 11 years from starting 1,873 2,956 1,042 1,776 2,906 1,245
Average repay 12 years from starting 1,998 3,269 716 1,503 2,478 831
Average repay 13 years from starting 1,577 2,789 377 1,616 2,791 423
Table 3: Voluntary repayments summary statistics
In Table 4 we estimate the probability of individuals from higher income households making
any voluntary repayments. We estimate a probit model with a dummy set equal to one if an
individual makes any repayment in a given year. The results show that individuals we classify as
being from a higher income household are significantly more likely to make voluntary repayments,
even conditional on their current earnings. They are about one percentage point more likely to
make voluntary repayments, on a baseline of 3.3%.
Add Add Add
Repayments Gender Earnings HESA
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Higher Income HH .189*** .191*** .182*** .142***
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007)
P (repays > 0| Lower income HH) .033 .033 .033 .033
P (repays > 0| Higher income HH) .048 .048 .047 .044
N 666,376 666,376 666,376 666,376
Table 4: Probit regression predicting ever making repayments. *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** the 5%
level. Controls for cohort, age and year are included in all columns.
Table 5 further investigates voluntary repayments by highlighting differences in the size of in-
dividual repayments. The table shows results from regressing the individual voluntary repayments
made by students on demographic characteristics and the higher income household indicator. Indi-
vidual repayments from those from higher income households are considerably larger than for those
from lower income households. Again, this holds true when controls for gender and current earnings
are added. Among those who make voluntary repayments, those from higher income households
make repayments that are around £1,000 larger on average. When HESA controls for subject-
institution mix of students doing the same course are included, this estimate reduces to around
£600, but remains statistically significant. Finally, in column 5 we show results using a tobit rather
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than OLS, with the same specification as in column 4. The broad result - that coming from a higher
income household is associated with higher voluntary repayments - is robust, and indeed consider-
ably stronger than in column 4, with individuals from higher income households repaying around
£1,200 more, conditional on gender, earnings and university characteristics. This strongly favours
the argument that individuals borrowing exactly x are indeed from more advantaged households
than those who borrow different amounts.
Add Add Add
Repayments Gender Earnings HESA Tobit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Higher Income HH 976.9*** 958.5*** 966.9*** 614.5*** 1207.0***
(55.819) (55.804) (55.870) (59.938) (55.170)
Female -384.6*** -395.0*** -334.2*** 462.1***
(51.319) (51.436) (53.884) (48.312)
Earnings -0.00386** -0.00839*** -0.0119***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 2624.6*** 2849.8*** 2949.1*** 2502.9*** -10595.2***
(72.526) (78.423) (85.489) (720.306) (646.125)
N 22,176 22,176 22,176 22,176 666,376
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.069 0.070 0.095 -
Table 5: Size of total voluntary repayments (£), conditional on making them. *** indicates significant at the 1%
level; ** the 5% level. Female is a dummy set equal to one for women. Controls for cohort, age and year are included
in all columns. Column 5 is run with the same set of controls as column 4.
Column 5 also shows that conditional on making repayments, women make larger repayments by
around £460 on average. The sign is flipped compared to the OLS, suggesting differential selection
into repayment by gender. Meanwhile, the relation between voluntary repayments and current
earnings is economically immaterial, despite being statistically significant (the earnings coefficient
in column 5 suggests a £10,000 increase is associated with a reduction in voluntary repayments
of just £12). Hence graduates own income levels do not appear to influence whether they make
voluntary repayments.21
4.1.2 Treatment of those borrowing below the unassessed maximum
We also investigate closely those who borrow less than the unassessed borrowing maximum (i.e.
£x in Figure 1) to best determine how they should be treated. We repeat the above analysis,
splitting out those who borrow below x (Type A, or ‘low borrowers’) and above x (Type B, or ‘high
borrowers’) from those who borrow exactly x (Type X - higher income households).
Figure 3 shows the distribution of university attendance for the three groups, split by gender.
Note that this differs from Figure 2 by showing the density function for each of the three groups
21This result is surprising, although it is important to keep in mind that involuntary repayments are by defini-
tion higher for anyone above the income threshold for repayment, meaning higher earnings individuals are paying
more on average overall. It is possible that higher earnings are associated with higher financial literacy and better
understanding of the system (because the interest rate is so low, it is not obvious why people would want to make
involuntary repayments). However, we do not think this is important for our conclusions here.
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so that the total for each group sums to one. The most notable feature is the high share of Type
A ‘low borrowers’ in the group of universities with missing entry scores. This group of institutions
typically consists of smaller, lower-status universities and Further Education colleges. Beyond that,
it is clear that Type A ‘low borrowers’ look much more like Type B ‘high borrowers’ than they do
typical Type X high income household individuals. A very low share of Type A ‘low borrowers’
and Type B ‘high borrowers’ attend the top 30% of universities, with a tiny fraction going to the
























































University groups, based on position in distribution of exam scores of entrants
Higher Income HH (Type X)
Low Borrowers (Type A)
























































University groups, based on position in distribution of exam scores of entrants
Higher Income HH (Type X)
Low Borrowers (Type A)
High Borrowers (Type B)
Women
Figure 3: Share of individuals attending different university groups from different parts of the borrowing distribution.
In Table A1 in the Appendix, we investigate voluntary repayments of Type A ‘low borrowers’
and Type B ‘high borrowers’ relative to Type X higher income household individuals. Both make
much smaller voluntary repayments than the latter, with Type A ‘low borrowers’ making smaller
voluntary repayments than Type B ‘high borrowers’ individuals. Of course, Type A individuals
have lower debt, which makes them less likely to make large repayments. However, this is a big
difference compared to Type X higher income household individuals, and is suggestive that they
again are more like Type B individuals than Type X individuals. Based on the evidence here,
we treat Type A and B individuals as our ‘lower income household’ group. We investigate the
robustness to this assumption in our subsequent analysis. We now move on to consider the raw
earnings differences between individuals from the two groups.
4.2 Descriptive earnings differences
Figure 4 shows the earnings distribution for male and female graduates from higher income house-
holds (grey triangles), graduates from lower income households (black circles) and for non gradu-
ates (grey line), for the 1999 cohort in 2012/13. The non graduate sample comes from the HMRC
18
databases (more information is given in Britton et al. (2018)), including a discussion of the rela-
tively high proportion of graduates and non-graduates who have zero or low earnings. In that paper
we argue this is a combination of higher earners who are working abroad and hence do not pay tax,
lower earners with intermittent attachment to the labour market and part time and self-employed
workers who will fall below the tax threshold.). Points to the right of each figure show the mean
for each group. The results are striking; graduates from higher income households earn more right
across the distribution, from the 20th percentile upwards, for both females and males. Whilst
graduates from both lower and higher income households earn more than non graduates, the gap
between graduates from lower and higher income backgrounds is also sizeable, particularly at the
very top of the distribution. Indeed, whilst around 20% of the graduate population come from
higher income households by our definition, of those in the top 1% of the earnings distribution,



































































Figure 4: Earnings distribution for individuals in the 1999 cohort in 2012/13 (October 2012 prices) for those from
higher income households vs. individuals from lower income households, with the non-university distribution also
included. Means given on the RHS of the plot.
As already discussed, students from different socio-economic backgrounds take different degrees,
with students from higher income households more likely to attend high status universities. It
is possible that this sorting into universities could explain the raw earnings differences between
those from high and lower income households. Figure 5 takes the first step to address this by
plotting average earnings (conditional on earnings being positive) for graduates by the university
groups defined above, by gender. Even within these institution groups, the differences in average
earnings between graduates from high and lower income households are clear, suggesting that
broadly speaking even when comparing graduates from similar institutions, those from a higher
income background go on to do better in the labour market. This appears to be particularly
















































































































































Figure 5: Average earnings (given earnings > 0, October 2012 prices) for graduates from higher and lower income
households by university tariff group.
Of course, these figures do not properly control for different degree choices between those from
high and lower income backgrounds. Individuals from higher income households might attend the
more selective institutions within our coarse university grouping, or might make subject choices that
lead to higher earnings. In the next section we try to address this more formally by investigating
earnings differences conditional on subject and institution, as well as some other demographic
characteristics.
5 Estimation
In Table 6 we estimate the following, conditional on individuals having positive earnings22
ln(yit) = α+ βHi +X
′
itγ + it (1)
where yit is earnings of individual i at time t, Hi is an indicator for whether an individual is from
a higher income household and Xit is a vector of controls. We sequentially add additional controls
into the vector X.
Columns 1 and 2 indicate the raw differential in earnings between students from higher income
households, conditioning only on cohort and year. The differences in earnings are sizeable at around
21% for men and 16% for women. Controlling for subject of degree in columns 3 and 4 reduces
these premia by 1-2 percentage points, suggesting that choice of subject explains very little of the
22Alongside this approach, we also estimated a probit model predicting employment. We find negligible differences
in employment between individuals from high and low income households (see Appendix for more details). However,
the data does not include an indicator of whether someone is employed or not. We infer employment from whether
or not positive earnings are reported. This means we define employment as those with zero earnings. This will
unfortunately also include individuals who move abroad. This could be more common for individuals coming from
higher income households, again causing some bias and an underestimate of the socio-economic gap in employment.
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differences in earnings. Despite the early specialisation of English degrees, it appears that the
phenomenon of socio-economic gaps in earnings is not primarily driven by subject choice or sorting
of students from higher income households into particular subject areas. By contrast, adding
variables which control for the different characteristics of students attending a particular degree
course reduces the coefficients considerably (columns 5 and 6 - labelled HESA controls in the table,
i.e. including variables describing the course participants from the HESA data). This implies that
the nature of the degree course, particularly the entry tariff score, explains more of the variation
in earnings between high and lower income students than does their choice of subject. In the final
column we include university fixed effects (labelled HEI fixed effects in the table). This does not
make an appreciable impact on the coefficients, over and above controlling for the characteristics of
the students attending a particular degree course. Overall the results indicate that even allowing
for both institution and subject, students from higher income households earn around 10% more
than students from lower income households. This suggests that higher education does not fully
level the playing field in terms of graduates’ earnings.
Unconditional Plus subject Plus HESA Plus HEI
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Higher income HH 0.205*** 0.157*** 0.185*** 0.150*** 0.108*** 0.0970*** 0.113*** 0.102***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Cohort poly Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HESA controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
HEI fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.059 0.110 0.077 0.121 0.083 0.126 0.089
N 399,463 470,272 399,463 470,272 399,463 470,272 399,463 470,272
Table 6: Regression of log earnings on higher income dummy and various controls. Includes the 1999-2005 cohorts
and earnings data between 2008/09 and 2013/14. *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level. HESA controls include variables describing the characteristics of students enrolled
on the course. HEI fixed effects include fixed effects for each institution.
We assess the robustness of our findings to different definitions of higher income in Table 7.23
Defining a student as being from a higher income family in a number of different ways, we still
obtain the same broad result which is that there remains a wage premium coming from a higher
income household of approximately 10%, even conditioning on degree subject and institution. The
alternative definitions of higher income student are as follows, where x and y are defined in Figure
1:
• Baseline definition: amount borrowed = x;
23We also tested the robustness of our results to including second HESA moments at the course level where possible
and found that it made a negligible difference.
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• Definition 1: amount borrowed ≤ x;
• Definition 2: amount borrowed < y;
• Definition 3: amount borrowed = x, but individuals with amount borrowed < x excluded.
Baseline Definition 1 Definition 2 Definition 3
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Higher income HH 0.113*** 0.102*** 0.099*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.075*** 0.126*** 0.115***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Cohort poly Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HESA controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HEI fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.089 0.126 0.089 0.126 0.089 0.141 0.101
N 399,463 470,272 399,463 470,272 399,463 470,272 283,904 327,578
Table 7: Robustness of earnings regression to higher income definition. Includes the 1999-2005 cohorts and earnings
data between 2008/09 and 2013/14. *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at
the individual level. HESA controls include variables describing the characteristics of students enrolled on the course.
HEI fixed effects include fixed effects for each institution.
Another robustness check is presented in Table 8 which compares OLS regression estimates
to those obtained using a nearest-neighbour propensity score matching estimate. To deal with
convergence issues, we use the specification from columns 5 and 6 from Table 6 and match on the
same set of variables as included in the OLS equation. Again the results are very similar. For men,
the coefficient increases marginally by one percentage point, while for women it reduces slightly.
Hence even with an alternative, arguably more flexible estimation approach, we find that the wage
premium for students from higher income households is around 10%.
Baseline OLS Matching
Men Women Men Women
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Higher income HH 0.108*** 0.0970*** .118*** .094***
(0.004) (0.004) (.011) (.009)
Cohort poly Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
HESA controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
HEI fixed effects No No No No
N 399,463 470,272 399,463 470,272
Table 8: Matching estimates of differences in log earnings. Includes the 1999-2005 cohorts and earnings data
between 2008/09 and 2013/14. *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. HESA controls include variables describing the characteristics of students enrolled on the course.
HEI fixed effects include fixed effects for each institution.
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5.1 Heterogeneity
We are interested in potential heterogeneous effects, particularly across different subject areas. It
may be that the advantage of higher family income impacts upon some subject-occupation trajecto-
ries more than others. Table 9 shows the preferred specification but estimated separately for three
different subject areas, namely LEM (Law, Economics and Management courses), STEM (Science,
Technology, Engineering and Mathematics courses) and Other (the rest, typically humanities, lan-
guages and the arts). The wage premium from coming from a higher income household is similar
across all three subject areas except for women who take STEM subjects where interestingly the
premium is somewhat lower at around 7%.
LEM Other STEM
Men Women Men Women Men Women
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Higher income HH 0.104*** 0.101*** 0.117*** 0.111*** 0.106*** 0.0675***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Cohort poly Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HESA controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HEI fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.134 0.107 0.077 0.128 0.096
N 70,524 72,915 170,598 271,052 158,341 126,305
Table 9: Regression of log earnings on higher income dummy and controls by subject group. Includes the 1999-2005
cohorts and earnings data between 2008/09 and 2013/14. *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level. HESA controls include variables describing the characteristics of students
enrolled on the course. HEI fixed effects include fixed effects for each institution.
Another aspect of heterogeneity we are able to explore is the magnitude of the wage premium
from coming from a higher income family for those who attend different institutions. Figure 624
shows the wage premium for different groups of institutions, split by their average entry score.
It is striking that for males only, the wage premium for those from higher income backgrounds
is considerably larger if the student attended an institution in the top 5% of the institutional
distribution, at around 25%. For women this effect is not evident.






















































































































University groups (based on entry)
Women
Figure 6: higher income household effect split by university grouping, which is based on average entry scores of
their students (as in Figures 2, 3 and 5). Includes the 1999-2005 cohorts and earnings data between 2008/09 and
2013/14. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Corresponding tables given in the Appendix.
We also explore heterogeneity by age. Because we cannot disentangle age from cohort and year
effects, we show cohort effects holding year fixed in Figure 7, and year effects holding cohort fixed
in Figure 8. It is evident that the wage premium from coming from a higher income background
increases in both cases, suggesting that the impacts increase with age. Typically they appear to
rise to around 14% for men and 12% for women by graduates’ early thirties, starting at around
half that in each case in graduates’ mid twenties. There appear to be gender differences in how
the effect changes with age; for women, there appears to be a dip in both figures at points that
correspond to their early thirties, potentially due to family formation decisions. For men, this dip is
not present, with the effects apparently continuing to rise. It should again be kept in mind that the
time period we are investigating here coincides with the recovery from the 2008 recession. However,
the fact that we see such similar patterns by both cohort and year suggests that the findings are
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Women
Figure 7: higher income household effect split by cohort (inverted, to show increasing effect with age). Includes
earnings data between 2008/09 and 2013/14. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Corresponding tables




















































































2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Year
Women
Figure 8: higher income household effect split by year. Includes the 1999-2005 cohorts. Dashed lines represent 95%




(£000’s) from low from low
family income family income
(£000’s) (£000’s)
Men Women Men Women Men Women
20th Percentile
Higher Income HH 20.3 14.0 7.7∗∗∗ 4.4∗∗∗ 3.0∗∗∗ 1.7∗∗∗
1.1 .7 .9 .6 .7 .6
Lower Income HH 12.6 9.6
.5 .3
% Wage Premium 61.1 45.8 61.1 45.8 16.1 13.4
50th Percentile
Higher Income HH 35.0 27.8 8.0∗∗∗ 5.3∗∗∗ 3.3∗∗∗ 2.1∗∗∗
1.0 .7 .9 .6 .6 .6
Lower Income HH 27.0 22.5
.5 .4
% Wage Premium 29.6 23.6 29.6 23.6 10.9 8.6
90th Percentile
Higher Income HH 84.0 54.9 30.8∗∗∗ 13.5∗∗∗ 10.7∗∗∗ 6.2∗∗∗
7.0 2.1 6.8 2.0 1.8 1.3
Lower Income HH 53.2 41.4
1.5 .8
% Wage Premium 57.9 32.6 57.9 32.6 19.6 14.3
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions No No No No Yes Yes
Age No No No No Yes Yes
Subject fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
HEI fixed effects No No No No No No
HESA controls No No No No Yes Yes
N 18,038 20,413 18,038 20,413 18,038 20,413
Table 10: Earnings differences for graduates from lower and higher income households at the 20th, 50th and 90th
percentiles estimated from quantile regression models. Note that zero earnings are excluded from these regressions.
High family income premium indicates the additional earnings for graduates from a higher income household. Low
family income earnings indicates earnings of graduates from a lower income background. Percentage wage premium
calculates the wage premium for those coming from a higher income household compared to the earnings of those
from lower income households, assuming all controls are held constant across the two groups at their means. The
first two columns of results show raw estimated earnings for high and low household income earnings. The next two
show the difference in earnings from low household income. The final two columns show the conditional difference
from low household income - i.e. the difference once controls for region, age, subject and student characteristics are
included. All figures are in £000’s. Uses 2011/12 and 2012/13 data and the 1999 cohort (estimates are given for
2012/13). Standard errors are clustered at HEP level. * indicates significantly different to the base (lower family
income) at 10% level, ** 5% and *** 1%. HESA controls include variables describing the characteristics of students
enrolled on the course. HEI fixed effects include fixed effects for each institution.
Finally, in Table 10 we investigate the magnitude of the wage premium at different quantiles
of the earnings distribution, motivated in part by the strong policy interest in England in effects
through the distribution rather than just at the mean. Due to issues with convergence of the
estimator, we use a restricted dataset that includes only the 1999 cohort in 2011/12 and 2012/13.
We provide raw earnings and conditional estimates at the 20th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the
distribution, separately by gender. What is striking is that although at the median the conditional
wage premium for men and women is around 10%, this rises to 16-20% for men at the bottom
(20th percentile) and the top (90th percentile) of the distribution. A similar, though less stark
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pattern is present for women. This implies that those from higher income households are both
better protected against low earnings and more likely to achieve high earnings.
5.2 Summary
In summary, men from higher income households (with median household income of around £77,000,
2018 prices) earn around 21% more than men from lower income households (with median house-
hold income of around £26,000, 2018 prices), while the equivalent figure for women is 16%. These
estimates roughly halve to around 10% once controls for university, subject and other demograph-
ics are included. The differences appear to increase with age, doubling between individuals’ mid
twenties and their early thirties, before levelling off for women but continuing for to rise for men.
This suggests previous work which has focussed on socio-economic differences in early career out-
comes (for example, Macmillan et al. (2013); Crawford et al. (2016)) may underestimate earnings
gaps. Given our data limitations on the career paths of these individuals, this encourages further
research. In particular it would be interesting to determine whether earnings differences by family
background in graduates’ early thirties are driven by greater participation in postgraduate study
or perhaps initial placement into careers with faster earnings trajectories. Whether differences in
earnings by parental income exist, even conditional on early career choices, is also an important
research question.
The socio-economic gap in graduates’ earnings is similar across broad subject groupings, with
the exception of women doing STEM courses, for whom the earnings gap is considerably smaller.
This latter result may be attributable to the types of occupations pursued by women in STEM,
particularly those in medicine and the public sector where salaries are more regulated and hence
where coming from a more advantaged family may make less difference to earnings. It could also
be a selection effect, if women pursuing STEM are somewhat atypical and if family background
makes less of a difference to these atypical women in their career prospects.
We find large earnings variation by university type: men from higher income households at-
tending universities with the most demanding entry requirements earn around 25% more than their
relatively less well off peers, even holding institution and subject choice constant. This is a stark
finding, suggesting being from a higher earning household is particularly advantageous at the top
institutions for men. For women we do not observe this result: a finding that aligns with Crawford
and Vignoles (2014) and Dolton and Vignoles (2000) which both find larger effects of private school-
ing on earnings for men than for women. While we cannot explain this gender difference, we know
from other research that earnings from the top institutions are considerably higher than elsewhere
(Britton et al. (2016)) and also that there are large differences in the occupational choices of men
and women, even comparing those who take the same degree subject (for example, Hakim (2016)).
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It is possible that some of the advantages of coming from a wealthy background are particularly
pertinent right at the very top of the distribution. We explore this further when we investigate
effects through the earnings distribution.
However, our quantile regression results suggest that the advantages of coming from a higher
income household are larger at the bottom and top than at the middle of the earnings distribution
for both men and women. This suggests that there is still an advantage for women going into very
high earning occupations.
The overall earnings differences we observe are large, particularly given the bluntness of our
parental income measure. Indeed we believe this bluntness is likely to result in an underestimate of
the true difference. This is because some lower income individuals will borrow the higher income
maximum, while some higher income individuals will borrow less than their full allocation. Further,
some individuals will not borrow at all; and we would expect these to be especially from higher
income households. All of these issues are likely to bias downward our estimates.
6 Mobility scorecards
The results above suggest that attending university does not appear to be levelling the playing
field in terms of earnings. In this section, we follow Chetty et al. (2017) and estimate mobility
scorecards to consider which are the best institutions and courses for encouraging social mobility.
This has potentially important implications for policymakers trying to reduce the earnings gaps
that we have highlighted in this paper.
Specifically we investigate the extent to which different subjects and universities appear to help
individuals from lower income backgrounds to become top earners, defined as having earnings in
the top quintile of the earnings distribution. We split this analysis out by gender, although we con-
sider the probability of getting to the top 20% of the overall earnings distribution, pooled across
genders.25 Chetty et al. (2017) define a mobility score for a given university as follows:
P (Child in Q5 and Parent in Q1) = P (Parent in Q1) x P (Child in Q5 | Parent in Q1)
Where Q5 is the top quintile of the income distribution and Q1 is the lowest quintile. We are
limited to a binary indicator of household income and we therefore estimate the probability of a
child making it to the top quintile of the earnings distribution given they are from a lower income
household. Figures 9 and 10 follow Chetty et al. (2017) by plotting, for men and women respectively,
P (Child in Q5 | Lower income household) on P (Lower income household) for 21 subject groups we
25Results looking at the gender-specific distributions are available on request from the authors.
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observe in our data (see the Appendix for more information on the subject groupings and for the
numbers behind the chart). For each subject we give the rank of their overall scorecard,26 and for a
subset we show their mobility score. The figures give a sense of how good different subject groups
are at delivering individuals that come from lower income households to the top of the graduate
earnings distribution. We reiterate that care is needed in interpreting these findings, since our
‘lower income household’ individuals are lower income only in a relative sense and make up 80% of
our population of students.
Med = .400
Econ = .273
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Figure 9: Subject mobility scorecard for men. Earnings rankings use the 2011/12-2013/14 tax years, treating
individual observations as independent. The results are not very sensitive to this approach, however. The numbers
to the bottom left of each point represent within-gender subject ranking by the mobility index, which is the product
of the x and y axes. We also show the mobility score for a subset of subject. See Appendix for full subject definitions
and set of mobility scores.
Medicine and economics are the highest performing subject groups by this measure (with scores
of 0.4 and 0.273 respectively for men and 0.33 and 0.353 for women). Although these subjects are
amongst the worst performing subjects in terms of the proportion of students enrolled from lower
income backgrounds (65%), their delivery of students into the top 20% of the earnings distribution
is very good. At least 40% of lower income students taking these subjects get into the top 20%
of the overall earnings distribution. Other high mobility subject groups are maths and computing
26Note that ‘rank’ is based on multiplying the corresponding points on the x and y axis together. The maximum
score is one, which would mean taking 100% poorer students and delivering them all into the top 20%.
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and engineering and technology. Miscellaneous law economics and management subjects also do
relatively well.27
On the other hand, we see languages and literature, history and philosophy, linguistics and
classics and biological and physical sciences all have a relatively low share of lower income students
enrolled and also have very poor delivery of those students into the top of the earnings distribution.
Though creative arts does far better at enrolling students from lower income backgrounds, it is the
worst subject in terms of enabling students from lower income households to reach the top of the
earnings distribution. This latter result is because more generally students taking creative arts are
less likely to achieve very high earnings, rather than being attributable to some failure within this
subject for poorer students to thrive. Nonetheless, from a social mobility perspective, it is clear




























































.55 .6 .65 .7 .75 .8 .85 .9 .95 1
Share of students from lower income households
Figure 10: Subject mobility scorecard for women. Earnings rankings use the 2011/12-2013/14 tax years, treating
individual observations as independent. The results are not very sensitive to this approach, however. The numbers
to the bottom left of each point represent within-gender subject ranking by the mobility index, which is the product
of the x and y axes. We also show the mobility score for a subset of subject. See Appendix for full subject definitions
and set of mobility scores.
Figures 11 and 12 repeat the same exercise, but for universities. This gives an indication of
27This is a broad subject group and includes students whose subject group at their given institution was too small
for us to get their detailed subject grouping.
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how each university is delivering individuals that come from lower income households into the
top quintile of the graduate earnings distribution. The results show a clear negative relationship
between the share of poorer students and the probability of them getting into the top 20% of the
earnings distributions. The best performing of the named institutions are clearly those based in

















































.4 .6 .8 1
Share of students from lower income households
Figure 11: Institution mobility scorecard for men. Earnings rankings use the 2011/12-2013/14 tax years, treating
individual observations as independent. The results are not very sensitive to this approach, however. We label a
subset of universities we have been granted permission to name. Numbers behind this figure are available in the
Appendix.
For men, around 60% of students at the prominent London-based institutions are from lower-
income households, compared to less than 50% at Oxford, Cambridge and Bristol. The former all
deliver at least 40% of these individuals into the top 20% of the earnings distribution, with the LSE
doing the best out of the named institutions by delivering more than 50% into the top. Warwick is
the highest performing of the named non-London institution in terms of the mobility score (0.238).
It accepts similar shares of poor students to Durham, York, Exeter, Southampton and Cardiff,
but is considerably more successful at delivering them to the top of the earning distribution. The
worse performing institutions have a delivery rate of under 10%. For women, the LSE and Imperial
College appear to have relatively high rates of mobility, accepting similar shares of poorer students
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to Newcastle, Manchester, UCL, Southampton and Liverpool, but performing dramatically better
in terms of delivery into the top. Oxford, Cambridge and Bristol are again similar, with amongst
the lowest shares of students from poorer backgrounds and delivery in to the top of around 30%.
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Figure 12: Institution mobility scorecard for women. Earnings rankings use the 2011/12-2013/14 tax years, treating
individual observations as independent. The results are not very sensitive to this approach, however. We label a
subset of universities we have been granted permission to name. Numbers behind this figure are available in the
Appendix.
These mobility scorecards are all clearly descriptive and do not therefore reflect the causal
impact of these institutions on students’ earnings. For example, the scorecards do not account for
subject compositions of courses, or indeed institution compositions of subjects and do not adjust
for proximity to the higher wage labour market in London, which is clearly an important factor.
The data also refer to courses taken some years ago and hence may not reflect the outcomes from
courses currently offered by these institutions. Not least, results are likely to have been affected
by policy reform since 2005 and also the increase in contextualised admissions. However, they
do illustrate the point that historically at least, some institutions admit a large number of lower
income students but such students do not necessarily go on to have high earnings, whereas some




Using an innovative administrative data set, consisting of hard linked tax and student loan indi-
vidual level data, as well as aggregate data on graduates’ degree courses, we document how the
earnings of graduates from relatively higher and lower income households vary, even after allowing
for differences in subject taken and institution attended. The paper is the first of its kind to use
such data in the English context to examine the correlation between a measure of higher parental
income (i.e. those in the top fifth of the household income distribution of those borrowing from the
SLC to attend HE) and graduates’ earnings, whilst being able to take account in some detail for
the type of higher education experienced.
The main finding from this paper is that graduates’ family background - specifically whether
they come from a relatively lower or higher income household - continues to influence graduates’
earnings long after graduation. The socio-economic gap in graduates’ earnings is by no means
entirely explained by differences in the subjects studied or institutions attended, though it is ap-
proximately halved once we account for these factors. When we take account of different student
characteristics, degree subject and institution attended, the gap between graduates from higher
and lower income households is still sizeable, at around 10% at the mean and median. Further, we
find that the gap is larger at the 20th and 90th percentiles of the graduate earnings distribution,
suggesting that coming from a higher income household both protects against low earnings and
provides greater opportunity for very high earnings. Men from high income households who attend
the most elite universities appear to do particularly well in terms of their earnings.
Clearly, there are caveats to these findings. First, our measure of parental income is blunt, and
we miss the roughly 15% of students who are non-borrowers, who are likely to be from the highest
income households. We argue that our estimate is likely to be an underestimate of the true earnings
differences between the richest and the poorest households. Second, we are analysing earnings in
the post-2008 crash period, which may have impacted on the magnitude of our estimates. It is
conceivable that the magnitude of the socio-economic gap in graduates’ earnings may be affected
by the state of the labour market, with students from the wealthiest families being better able to
secure the good jobs that become more scarce during a recession. Third, changes to the higher
education funding system in England in the intervening period may also mean that the magnitude
of the socio-economic gap in earnings could differ going forward, for example due to the large
subsequent increases in tuition fees and the increase in contextualised admissions policies.
However, the fact that we observe such robust effects are highly important, and suggest that
simply focussing on getting poorer students into university is not enough. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, this paper encourages future research into the drivers of the earnings differences that we
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observe. Possible explanations include differences in attainment on entry to university, performance
at university, progression onto postgraduate study, early career occupation and location decisions
and career progression, networks, or non-cognitive skills. Uncovering the most important of these
drivers could have significant implications for policy, universities and firms. Researchers seeking
solutions for improving social mobility might also find inspiration from the subjects and institutions
that are best performing in terms of their social mobility scorecards.
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Appendix A: Voluntary Repayments
Add Add Add
Repayments Gender Earnings HESA
[1] [2] [3] [4]
High Borrowing (Type B) -837.6*** -817.5*** -826.4*** -505.3***
(61.4) (61.4) (61.4) (63.2)
Low Borrowing (Type A) -1171.8*** -1155.6*** -1163.2*** -858.2***
(66.3) (66.3) (66.3) (75.0)




Constant 3598.9*** 3807.0*** 3913.3*** 3167.9***
(83.2) (87.6) (95.0) (720.6)
N 22,176 22,176 22,176 22,176
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.071 0.071 0.096
Table A1: Size of total voluntary repayments (£), conditional on making them, relative to Type X individuals. ***
indicates significant at the 1% level; ** the 5% level. Female is a dummy set equal to one for women. Controls for
cohort, age and year are included in all columns.
Appendix B: Heterogeneity estimates
No Intake
Information Bottom HEPs Lower Middle HEPs Middle HEPs Top HEPs Very Top HEPs
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Higher income HH 0.0982*** 0.0993*** 0.0945*** 0.130*** 0.0951*** 0.256***
(0.016) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.023)
Cohort poly Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HESA controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HEI fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.080 0.105 0.155 0.177 0.182
N 79,500 89,436 99,279 94,106 25,875 11,267
Table A2: Estimation of % earnings differences between high and lower income households by HEP group, for men.
Includes the 1999-2005 cohorts and earnings data between 2008/09 and 2013/14. *** indicates significant at the 1




Information Bottom HEPs Lower Middle HEPs Middle HEPs Top HEPs Very Top HEPs
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Higher income HH 0.158*** 0.104*** 0.0913*** 0.0986*** 0.108*** 0.0671**
(0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.023)
Cohort poly Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HESA controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HEI fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.057 0.073 0.109 0.140 0.144
N 88,005 114,069 120,243 111,085 26,750 10,120
Table A3: Estimation of % earnings differences between high and lower income households by HEP group, for
women. Includes the 1999-2005 cohorts and earnings data between 2008/09 and 2013/14. *** indicates significant
at the 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Table provides raw data behind Figure
6 in main text.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Higher income HH 0.141*** 0.123*** 0.137*** 0.107*** 0.117*** 0.106*** 0.0797***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Cohort poly Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HESA controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HEI fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.098 0.096 0.083 0.081 0.099 0.141
N 54,291 55,965 57,566 57,702 57,855 56,481 59,603
Table A4: Estimation of % earnings differences between high and lower income households by cohort, for men.
Includes earnings data between 2008/09 and 2013/14. *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors
are clustered at the individual level. Table provides raw data behind Figure 7 in main text.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Higher income HH 0.118*** 0.123*** 0.144*** 0.116*** 0.0952*** 0.0845*** 0.0443***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Cohort poly Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HESA controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HEI fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.086 0.080 0.069 0.063 0.070 0.071 0.130
N 61,806 65,101 67,071 67,607 68,203 68,198 72,286
Table A5: Estimation of % earnings differences between high and lower income households by cohort, for women.
Includes earnings data between 2008/09 and 2013/14. *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors
are clustered at the individual level. Table provides raw data behind Figure 7 in main text.
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2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Higher income HH 0.0515*** 0.0857*** 0.113*** 0.124*** 0.133*** 0.139***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Cohort poly Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HESA controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HEI fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.184 0.128 0.105 0.102 0.104 0.107
N 67,244 66,009 66,633 67,106 66,441 66,030
Table A6: Estimation of % earnings differences between high and lower income households by year, for men.
Includes the 1999-2005 cohorts. *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. Table provides raw data behind Figure 8 in main text.
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Higher income HH 0.0589*** 0.0837*** 0.102*** 0.110*** 0.119*** 0.111***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Cohort poly Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HESA controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HEI fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.106 0.080 0.075 0.072 0.076
N 79,851 78,008 78,744 78,639 77,575 77,455
Table A7: Estimation of % earnings differences between high and lower income households by year, for women.
Includes the 1999-2005 cohorts. *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. Table provides raw data behind Figure 8 in main text.
Appendix D: Employment probabilities
Men Women
Add Add Add Add
Employment Subject HESA Employment Subject HESA
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Higher Income HH -.003 .010 .014* .046*** .058*** .036***
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
P (earn > 0| Lower income HH) .867 .867 .867 .873 .873 .873
P (earn > 0| Higher income HH) .866 .869 .870 .882 .884 .880
N 460,656 460,656 460,656 538,908 538,908 538,908
Table A8: Probit regression predicting employment. Predicted probability gives the probability of those from lower
income households having non-zero earnings. *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** the 5% level. Controls for
cohort, age and year are included in all columns, with sequential addition of subject and HESA controls as indicated.
Appendix E: Mobility scorecard tables
Subject abbreviations used in Figures 9 and 10.
Medicine and Dentistry (Med); Subjects allied to Medicine (All Med); Biological Sciences (Bio
Sci); Veterinary Sciences, Agriculture and related subjects (Vet, Agri); Physical Sciences (Phy
Sci); Mathematical and Computer Sciences (Math & Com); Engineering and Technologies (Eng
& Tech); Architecture, Building and Planning (Arch); Social studies (Soc Sci); Economics (Econ);
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Law (Law); Business and Administrative studies (Bus); Mass Communications and Documentation
(Mass Comm); Linguistics, Classics and related subjects (Ling Class); European Languages, Litera-
ture and related subjects (Lang & Lit); Historical and Philosophical studies (Hist & Phil); Creative
Arts and Design (Cre Art); Education (Educ); STEM, LEM and Other represent miscellaneous
STEM, LEM and Other courses - where individuals are in classes that are too small for us to be
given their fine subject grouping. In these cases, we simply get their broader subject grouping.
Lower Income Delivery to Mobility Score Mobility Score
Rank Subject Share (A) top 20% (B) (A*B) Standard error N
1 Medicine & Dentistry 0.604 0.662 0.400 0.007 4284
2 Economics 0.594 0.460 0.273 0.008 3510
3 LEM 0.883 0.266 0.235 0.008 2772
4 Education 0.825 0.263 0.217 0.004 12399
5 Maths & Computing 0.801 0.266 0.213 0.002 28071
6 Engineering & Technology 0.727 0.285 0.207 0.003 17916
7 Allied Medicine 0.846 0.241 0.204 0.005 7011
8 Law 0.771 0.259 0.200 0.004 7950
9 Business 0.776 0.234 0.182 0.002 26262
10 STEM 0.858 0.207 0.178 0.005 6708
11 Architecture 0.793 0.218 0.173 0.006 3993
12 Physical Sciences 0.666 0.228 0.152 0.003 11358
13 Languages & Literature 0.625 0.242 0.151 0.009 1776
14 Social Sciences 0.701 0.211 0.148 0.003 12762
15 Vetinary/Agriculture 0.833 0.178 0.148 0.009 1635
16 Other 0.827 0.173 0.143 0.002 24177
17 Linguistics & Classics 0.729 0.171 0.125 0.005 5094
18 History & Philosophy 0.601 0.202 0.122 0.004 8451
19 Biological Sciences 0.749 0.150 0.112 0.003 13947
20 Mass Communication 0.846 0.115 0.097 0.004 6897
21 Creative Arts 0.826 0.096 0.080 0.002 23355
Table A9: Subject mobility scorecard table for men.
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Lower Income Delivery to Mobility Score Mobility Score
Rank Subject Share (A) top 20% (B) (A*B) Standard error N
1 Economics 0.774 0.457 0.353 0.014 1206
2 Medicine & Dentistry 0.564 0.585 0.330 0.006 5994
3 Maths & Computing 0.865 0.227 0.196 0.005 7389
4 Engineering & Technology 0.869 0.222 0.193 0.007 2802
5 Law 0.791 0.194 0.154 0.003 14052
6 LEM 0.927 0.162 0.151 0.008 2151
7 Business 0.812 0.174 0.141 0.002 23880
8 Allied Medicine 0.886 0.145 0.128 0.002 19698
9 Education 0.815 0.152 0.124 0.002 35886
10 Architecture 0.839 0.144 0.121 0.010 1116
11 STEM 0.853 0.138 0.117 0.005 4749
12 Languages & Literature 0.544 0.213 0.116 0.005 3945
13 Physical Sciences 0.722 0.153 0.111 0.004 7218
14 Other 0.837 0.124 0.103 0.002 33678
15 History & Philosophy 0.640 0.151 0.097 0.003 8319
16 Social Sciences 0.782 0.123 0.096 0.002 20229
17 Linguistics & Classics 0.690 0.133 0.092 0.003 11862
18 Vetinary, Aggriculture 0.784 0.100 0.078 0.005 3402
19 Mass Communication 0.865 0.090 0.078 0.003 9984
20 Biological Sciences 0.744 0.104 0.077 0.002 21453
21 Creative Arts 0.807 0.065 0.053 0.001 30441
Table A10: Subject mobility scorecard table for women.
Lower Income Delivery to Mobility Score Mobility Score
Institution Share (A) top 20% (B) (A*B) Standard error N
Bristol 0.430 0.358 0.154 0.008 2193
Cambridge 0.405 0.455 0.184 0.008 2385
Cardiff 0.539 0.312 0.168 0.009 1581
Durham 0.533 0.356 0.190 0.008 2436
Edinburgh 0.387 0.246 0.095 0.010 798
Exeter 0.523 0.315 0.165 0.008 2115
Imperial 0.605 0.493 0.299 0.012 1383
King’s College 0.725 0.457 0.331 0.012 1536
LSE 0.636 0.549 0.349 0.022 453
Liverpool 0.736 0.277 0.204 0.008 2409
Manchester 0.616 0.339 0.209 0.006 4278
Newcastle 0.595 0.334 0.199 0.008 2487
Nottingham 0.459 0.412 0.189 0.007 3585
Oxford 0.388 0.499 0.193 0.008 2523
Southampton 0.560 0.324 0.181 0.008 2562
UCL 0.668 0.397 0.265 0.010 1809
Warwick 0.524 0.453 0.238 0.009 2145
York 0.524 0.337 0.177 0.010 1392
Table A11: Institution mobility scorecard table for men. Shows named institutions only, in alphabetical order.
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Lower Income Delivery to Mobility Score Mobility Score
Institution Share (A) top 20% (B) (A*B) Standard error N
Bristol 0.494 0.295 0.146 0.007 2295
Cambridge 0.444 0.297 0.132 0.007 2670
Cardiff 0.536 0.250 0.134 0.007 2205
Durham 0.558 0.202 0.113 0.006 2697
Edinburgh 0.382 0.233 0.089 0.008 1302
Exeter 0.582 0.202 0.118 0.007 2220
Imperial 0.619 0.506 0.313 0.018 645
King’s College 0.776 0.350 0.271 0.009 2205
LSE 0.679 0.491 0.333 0.030 252
Liverpool 0.692 0.197 0.136 0.007 2688
Manchester 0.642 0.249 0.160 0.005 4530
Newcastle 0.583 0.214 0.125 0.007 2538
Nottingham 0.535 0.292 0.156 0.006 3408
Oxford 0.411 0.361 0.148 0.008 2196
Southampton 0.650 0.208 0.135 0.006 3060
UCL 0.678 0.329 0.223 0.010 1854
Warwick 0.554 0.278 0.154 0.007 2361
York 0.550 0.179 0.098 0.008 1239
Table A12: Institution mobility scorecard table for women. Shows named institutions only, in alphabetical order.
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